Key Takeaways
- Venezuela is showing early signs of economic liberalization, particularly in the oil and mining sectors, presenting unique—but still high-risk—investment opportunities.
- Pending legislation could significantly loosen state control in oil production, with private companies gaining more autonomy and legal protections.
- U.S. sanctions remain in place, especially for key sectors like oil, telecommunications and mining, but evolving political conditions may create space for increased U.S. engagement.
- Non-oil sectors such as real estate, banking, electric power, infrastructure and logistics could become increasingly attractive, especially for investors with ties to Venezuela or high risk tolerance.
- Investors must be aware that all foreign investments are currently subject to domestic Venezuelan law, not international arbitration, though that may shift if reforms proceed.
For many years, Venezuela has proved challenging for foreign investment, with the government’s firm control of the country’s most significant export—oil—dating back to the creation of Petróleos de Venezuela, SA (“PDVSA”) in 1976. A brief period of liberalization followed the creation of PDVSA, but once the Chavez regime came to power in 1999, state control was extended beyond petroleum to the electric power, telecommunications and extraction sectors of the economy. After losing a number of lawsuits brought by foreign investors, Venezuela responded, in part, when it terminated several state-to-state bilateral investment treaties and eventually, in 2012, exited from the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) Convention.1
In March 2013, Nicolas Maduro came to power after the death of Hugo Chavez, and in 2014, the U.S. Congress enacted the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act of 2014.2 Among its provisions, the law required the U.S. president to impose sanctions on Venezuelan individuals identified as responsible for significant acts of violence, serious human rights abuses or antidemocratic actions. U.S. sanctions followed shortly thereafter, although those sanctions never expanded to comprise complete embargoes akin to those sanctions targeting Cuba and Iran. Rather, they have been directed at the government of Venezuela, certain sectors of the Venezuelan economy and several named individuals and entities. Specifically, to implement the Venezuela Defense of Human Rights and Civil Society Act:
- E.O. 13692, signed by President Barack Obama in March 2015, authorized the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) to impose sanctions against individuals and entities determined to be involved in undermining democratic processes, human rights abuses and public corruption. Approximately 150 individuals and entities would eventually be sanctioned under this executive order.
- E.O. 13808, signed by President Donald Trump in August 2017, began restrictions on U.S. persons doing business with PDVSA.
- E.O. 13827 and E.O. 13835, signed by President Trump in March and May 2018 respectively, prohibited access to U.S. financial markets, transactions involving digital currency issued by Venezuela, and transactions related to purchasing Venezuelan debt and debt owed to Venezuela as collateral.
- E.O. 13850, signed by President Trump in November 2018, led to action by OFAC in January 2019 to impose full blocking sanctions on PDVSA. This action froze PDVSA’s assets in the United States and prohibited U.S. persons from most dealings involving the PDVSA and any entity owned 50 percent or more by PDVSA.
- E.O. 13884, signed by President Trump in August 2019, blocked all property of the government of Venezuela in or transiting the United States. The government of Venezuela is broadly defined to include government agencies, the Central Bank of Venezuela, PDVSA, any entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the government and anyone acting on behalf of the government, including members of the Maduro regime. As a result, with the exception of certain limited licensed or authorized activities, U.S. persons generally are prohibited from engaging in transactions or other dealings, either directly or indirectly, with Venezuelan government-related entities.3
None of these sanctions has yet been rescinded. Now, however, with the removal of Maduro and some signs of cooperation from the government of Delcy Rodriguez, the U.S. has made clear that it would like to see a restoration of Venezuelan oil exports under U.S. control and with revenues directed to the United States.4 The slow pace of sanctions relief may, at least in part, be because of a reported reluctance of U.S. oil companies to commit to the types of large capital expenditures required to renovate and restore Venezuela’s hydrocarbon export capacity. Large capital investments would also be needed to expand the downstream refining of heavy crude of the type available from Venezuela. Notably, certain U.S. refineries are equipped to handle Venezuelan crude.
Nevertheless, the investment environment has somewhat brightened, not only for oil E&P companies and service providers, but also for U.S. individuals and entities looking to take advantage of opportunities in many other sectors of the Venezuelan economy, such as property and property management, banking and financial services, electric power, infrastructure and food distribution and logistics. Many of these areas may be of particular interest to Venezuelans who were forced or chose to leave the country during the past several decades.
Real estate prices, for example, are significantly depressed, and thus there exist situations where more risk-tolerant investors may be able to see rapid appreciation once stability and openness return to Venezuela. But this, of course, begs the question as to whether Venezuela is indeed about to reform and prosper or whether the current calm precedes new storms. In any event, as of now, investments into Venezuela, other than into certain special sectors (oil and gas, telecommunications, mining and social media) are governed by the Venezuelan Constitutional Law on Productive Foreign Investment adopted in 2017. This law submits all foreign investments to domestic jurisdiction and continues Venezuela’s reluctance, discussed above, to be subject to the international foreign investment authority of ICSID. That said, after the removal of Maduro, Venezuelan leadership has begun to demonstrate a recognition of the need for changes in domestic laws to encourage foreign investment.
For example, on Jan. 15, 2026, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez formally submitted to the Venezuelan Congress a bill proposing partial amendments to the Organic Hydrocarbons Law. As of Jan. 22, 2026, Congress had approved the bill in its initial vote, thereby advancing it to the next stage of review in a multi-stage process.
The bill seeks to amend 18 statutory articles and is structured around three principal areas of reform:
1. Incorporation of new business models, including production-sharing agreements, under which operating companies assume full management responsibility at their own risk and expense, with compensation determined as a percentage of audited production volumes.
2. Measures to ensure the economic viability of undeveloped “greenfield” areas, enabling investment and development in fields that have not yet entered production.
3. Enhanced legal protections for both foreign and domestic investors, including the use of independent dispute-resolution mechanisms consistent with the Venezuelan Constitution.
If enacted, this bill would loosen state control over the hydrocarbon sector to an extent not seen since before the Chavez administration. It would allow private companies to independently operate their own oil fields, market the crude they extract and contract with PDVSA to share the revenues.
In addition, on Jan. 20, 2026, the Venezuelan government announced that the acting president has submitted a bill to Congress for a new mining and minerals law. According to the government’s communication, this legislation is designed to enable the attraction of significant flows of international investment into the sector. The bill aims to expand production of gold, iron, bauxite and other minerals, with the stated objective of supporting national development and increasing the country’s generation of foreign currency revenues. Nevertheless, at least for the time being, the mining sector, including state-owned mining company Minerven, remains subject to U.S. sanctions.
The situation is clearly fluid. On the one hand, the current U.S. sanctions regime and the political volatility of Venezuela require caution when considering investment in the oil-rich nation. On the other hand, the enormous upside potential in the event of stabilization—across all economic sectors of Venezuela—including, in addition to oil and gas, infrastructure, property and property management, banking and financial services, and food distribution and logistics, makes it an interesting time for U.S. (and companies from other jurisdictions) to carefully evaluate and assess their investment options in Venezuela.
1 Exec. Order 14373, 91 Fed. Reg. 2045 (Jan. 9, 2026), “Safeguarding Venezuelan Oil Revenue for the Good of the American and Venezuelan People.” The outstanding uncollected damages from arbitral awards stemming from expropriation claims complicate the use of revenue from Venezuela’s sale of oil today.
2 P.L. 113-278; 50 U.S.C. §1701 note.
3 In October 2023, after Maduro and the opposition signed an agreement that included a road map for holding competitive elections, OFAC responded and issued GL 43, which authorized transactions with state-owned gold mining company Minerven, and GL 44, which authorized transactions by any company involving the oil and gas sector for six months. In January 2024, OFAC revoked GL 43 with the issuance of GL 43A after Venezuela’s supreme court upheld a ban on the candidacy of María Corina Machado (winner of the opposition primary). In April 2024, the Biden administration announced it would not renew GL 44, the oil sector license. Instead, OFAC issued a general license giving companies 45 days to wind down operations authorized by GL 44.
4 See Fact Sheet: President Trump is Restoring Prosperity, Safety and Security for the United States and Venezuela, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Jan. 7, 2026, https://www.energy.gov/articles/fact-sheet-president-trump-restoring-prosperity-safety-and-security-united-states-and.
